Bootleggers and Baptists in the

Theory of Regulation
The Bootlegger and Baptist theory of regulation (B&B) was born in 1983 when I was Executive Director of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Yandle, 1983) .
Along with other duties, I was responsible for the agency"s Consumer Advocacy
Program, an activity where the FTC intervened in the regulatory proceedings of other federal agencies in an effort to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the U.S.
economy. The agency"s intervention activities revealed a number of instances where seemingly odd interest-group alliances supported the same regulation. This was not the first time I had observed the odd-alliance phenomenon.
The idea that demand for the same regulation could come from two distinctly different interest groups, one that seemed to take moral high ground and another that simply wanted economic rents, had come to me in 1977 when I was a senior economist on the staff of the President"s Council on Wage and Price Stability. I was responsible for reviewing and commenting on new regulation proposed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In reviewing those rules, it became obvious that industry opposition to regulation was far from being monolithic. Almost invariably, there were firms or industry sectors that gained from regulation. For example, in EPA"s proposed rules regulating copper smelter emissions, the agency indicated there would never be another U.S. copper smelter once the rules became final. The rules, which set more stringent standards on new smelters than existing ones, were supported by major environmental groups. Later work on the copper smelter episode by Maloney and McCormick (1982) showed that copper producer shareholders earned abnormal positive returns when the smelter rule became final.
The major environmental groups celebrated, too. The results suggested that both polluters and environmentalists could gain from properly crafted regulation. 2 In my work on the first U.S. auto fuel economy rules, which were supported by environmental groups, I found that General Motors was lobbying for stricter standards My B&B theory was a small part of a growing literature on regulation theory.
Efforts by economists and other social scientists to explain the frequency and features of government regulation had moved in lock-step with the rise of regulation in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Those two decades saw a dramatic increase in the both the number of federal regulatory agencies and the pace at which the new agencies produced regulation. One measure of this activity is seen in Figure   1 , which reports the annual count of new pages in the Federal Register, a daily government publication in which new and revised are published.
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One striking example has, wondrously, attracted very little journalistic attention. The Carter Administration and its immediate predecessors made great strides in deregulating many industries, such as trucking, airlines, railroads, securities markets, and banking. This deregulation greatly increased the scope of free markets. It would take us far afield to go into the unfolding empirical evidence about the consequences of this deregulation here, but the preliminary indications are that it has greatly increased the efficiency of the American economy. Most strikingly in the area of trucking, the Reagan administration (at least up the point when this essay is written) has practically stopped this deregulation.
Pages of rules were being printed for the new social regulatory agencies, such as EPA, but pages of old rules were being removed for the older economic regulators, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission.
My explanation of the timing of the rise of social regulation and decline of economic regulation turns on the emergence of national network TV; this provided for the first time, a low-cost way for producers of consumer goods and services to market at low cost to a national market (Yandle, 2010a 
Theories of regulation
Five theories offer potential explanatory frameworks to use when considering features of regulation: Public Interest, Capture, Special Interest, Money for Nothing, and Bootleggers and Baptists. The public interest theory is the first and oldest theory of regulation and is not associated with one particular scholar. This theory holds that politicians and their appointees systematically seek to serve a broad public interest, always searching for lower cost ways to provide public benefits rather than advance the interests of particular groups at the expense of the public generally. If carbon emissions, other pollution, unhealthy working conditions, or teenage smoking are the problem to be addressed, then the legislature seeks to minimize global costs in reducing the cost that pollution, hazardous working conditions, or smoking impose on the population at large. If the cost of regulating is larger than the cost imposed by harmful activities, no action is taken. Of course, the public interest theory recognizes that politicians are human, and as a result, errors and even deliberate acts of chicanery will occur, but these failings are the exception, not the rule.
Dissatisfaction with the ability of the public interest theory to predict outcomes led to the development and refinement of the capture theory, a notion associated initially with the work of political scientist Marver Bernstein (1955) and economic historian Gabriel Kolko (1963) but later formalized by Stigler (1971) .
Capture theory recognizes that politicians and regulators face agency costs and the knowledge problem: There is no clear-cut definition of what might be the public interest for each bill being considered in a legislative session or for each rule a regulator must devise. To help remedy the situation, the dedicated legislator and regulator find an ample supply of advisors who happily recommend how best to vote or act on particular issues. The reason that so much advice is forthcoming rests on a notion that economists call "rent-seeking" behavior (Buchanan, Tullock, and Tollison (1980) transfer vast amounts of resources from taxpayers or consumers to the providers of politically favored services.
To illustrate, consider reducing automobile exhaust emissions. How might a regulator make this happen? One approach requires automobile producers to meet a performance standard without specifying how the standard is to be met. Under this approach, which requires monitoring air quality and auto emissions, environmental outcomes matter more than specification of inputs. Placing taxes on emissiongenerating fuels or on the emissions themselves is another approach. Again, air quality can be monitored and taxes raised or lowered to achieve environmental goals.
Finally, the regulator can specify how emissions will be controlled and require all auto producers to follow the same technology-based rules. If one firm is already using the specified technology or has an advantage in building it, then there is no cost imposed on that firm. Instead, the regulation raises rivals" costs (Shalop and Sheffman, 1983) . Ultimately, the U.S. EPA specified that all automobiles must have catalytic converters to reduce emissions, even if a particular automobile had little emissions. The converters relied on a technology developed by General Motors and brought profits to the patent owner. As air quality improved, GM made more money, and clean air lovers celebrated.
Capture theory may also explain how the railroads won the day when Congress empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate motor carriers in the 1935 (Motor Carrier Act of 1935 . 49 Stat. 543 (1935 ). This occurred after motor carriers began cutting prices for carrying freight and in spite of organized opposition from agricultural and other shipper interests (Felton and Anderson, 1989, p. 10). The rail interests were successful in forcing ICC controls on truckers.
But while capture theory seems to explain a good bit of regulation, it does not predict which party will capture when more than one is in the struggle, as is generally the case. For that, we must turn to the next theory of regulation. specific content of proposed legislation is simply auctioned off to the highest bidder.
By focusing on which parties have the most to lose (or gain) in the struggle, one can begin to understand outcomes. But this is just a first step in the process. In order to be a viable participant in the auction, the agent doing the bidding must know the consensus position of the group it represents. It is costly to organize an interest group, and the larger and more diverse the players, the greater the cost. Once organized, a consensus must be found regarding the policy outcome. And that is costly too. politicians. In a sense, there is little a politician can do to benefit or harm an unregulated industry. To get the industry"s attention, a politician announces that hearings will be held on the possibilities of calling for consumer protection regulation of the industry"s main product or services. Several bills are drafted and some have rather draconian proposed rules. Hoping to deflect these pending costs, the industry organizes, hires lobbyists, and makes prudent campaign contributions to strategically important politicians. The politicians relax the threat somewhat, but leave a few clouds in the sky. Regulation has been avoided but wealth has been extracted.
Finally, as noted earlier, B&B explains how successful lobbying efforts and durable regulation emerge when one interest group, labeled the Baptists, takes the moral high ground while another group, the bootleggers, use the Baptists for cover as they pursue a narrow economic end. For the theory to work, both parties must seek the same end result, and it is clearly not necessary for the two interest groups to communicate or even show up at the same meetings.
The B&B theory combines elements of public interest and special interest theories of regulation and sheds considerable light on a large number of regulatory episodes. Consider for example America"s grand experiment with Prohibition, which was finally passed into law in December 1917 after a long struggle by members of temperance leagues nationwide (Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1994) . Prohibition hindered the production, distribution, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages. They had cause for celebration too. Indeed, according to data on alcohol consumption, average intake actually increased during Prohibition, but not from the same kinds of beverages (Gifford, 1977, p. 66) . Beer consumption fell dramatically.
The consumption of spirits rose just as dramatically. The cost of monitoring movement of beer barrels was much lower than the cost of tracking equivalent amounts of alcohol in bottles of Scotch and moonshine. And of course, if getting a given volume of alcohol was risky and therefore costly, it made sense to get it in more powerful forms.
There is another bootlegger lurking in the Prohibition story. Meanwhile, the alcohol industry had been permanently restructured by the good cause, and spirits had become the drink of choice.
What regulation delivers
Regulations developed to address a perceived problem always generate benefits for some group and imposes costs as well. Sometimes, as in the Prohibition story, the costs and benefits are best seen in relative terms. Generally speaking, regulation is applied uniformly across firms and markets; there is a one-suit-fits-all outcome. But most of the time, there are substantial differences in technologies, products, and marketing practices across firms in an industry. Some players in an industry, or some consumers, gain a relative advantage. For example, Prohibition imposed higher costs on the beer industry and beer consumers than on the distilleries and consumers of spirits and regulation redefined the contours of the industries and markets that were subject to the rules.
Firms are generally quick to recognize the gains that can be secured through regulation. Indeed, success in gaining just the right rules that raise rivals" costs may lead to higher profits than working to increase market share. In 2000, for example, John Deere, with the aid of environmental pressure groups, petitioned the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to tighten the emission standards on small gasoline engine driven landscape appliances (Skrzyeki, 2000, p. C1) . It so happens that the firm holds patents on a new cleaner engine technology. Deere can easily meet the stricter standards; its competitors cannot. Another interesting coalition emerged when major energy producers joined hands with environmental groups to support the Kyoto Protocol and proposed cap-and-trade legislation for reducing carbon emissions (Yandle and Buck, 2002 , Yandle, 1999 , Yandle, 2010b A One should not conclude that B&B theory applies only to the United States or to the modern age (Yandle, 2009b, Yandle and Buck, 2002, Yandle, forthcoming b) .
Howard Marvel"s (1977) analysis of the 18 th century English Factory Acts indicates that the law restricting the use of child labor was supported by the owners of the new water-powered mills. Those same owners were celebrated as enlightened reform social leaders. Even the 1225 Magna Charta contains a specification standard for the width of all woven cloth sold in the realm. The stipulation addressed a consumer protection problem, we are told, it also happened to fit the looms of the London weavers, who supported the rule, but not those in Norwich (Yandle, 1984) .
Final thoughts
Lessons to be learned from theories of regulation cause us to consider economic interests when seeking to understand regulation and how the rules get formed. The theories say that politicians are like brokers who seek to balance competing demands for valuable political favors. But for the brokers to survive, the balancing act must generate benefits to interest groups that are appropriately situated.
The Bootlegger/Baptist theory emphasizes that greater political demand emerges when public interest groups add demand to that of those who seek strictly private interests. The theory helps us to understand the particular features of regulation and how those features may change when "bootleggers" or "Baptists" choose to disappear from the invisible alliance that supported demand for regulation.
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